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NEPAL: DEALING WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the wake of the royal coup of 1 February 2005, Nepal's 
human rights crisis is spiralling out of control. A year 
after the international community first formally expressed 
concern at the 2004 Commission on Human Rights, the 
Maoists continue to operate outside the law while state 
security forces act with impunity and without civilian 
control. The 61st Commission on Human Rights now 
underway gives Nepal's friends their best opportunity to 
begin to reverse the trends by establishing a strong UN 
human rights monitoring mission that could form the 
core of action towards peace.  
Using extortion and coercion, the Maoists are imposing 
an authoritarian regime on steadily increasing swathes of 
rural Nepal. State forces are engaged in well documented, 
systematic violations from extra-judicial executions to 
illegal detentions, "disappearances" and torture.  
By its willingness in recent years to give the royal 
government the benefit of the doubt and sidestep 
serious criticism and remedial action, the international 
community finds itself confronted today with what it 
fears the most: a no-party state that has decimated 
democracy, kills people at will in the countryside, 
forbids freedom of expression or dissent and demands 
unquestioning support for its unelected leader. It now 
recognises the gravity of the situation. A joint 
statement by bilateral donors and the UN in Nepal has 
warned that "insecurity, armed activity and CPN/M 
[Maoist] blockades are pushing Nepal toward the 
abyss of a humanitarian crisis". 
The repeated gentle urgings of the past have done 
nothing to prevent the dismantling of democracy. 
Apart from the assault on fundamental rights, the 
royal coup and the royal government's subsequent 
actions have emboldened the Maoists and made any 
resolution of the conflict all the more distant. As 
Crisis Group has warned before, the Maoists are the 
only party in Nepal's complex conflict with a clear 
strategy. The king's seizure of absolute power has not 
brought with it any new strategy that can hope to 
address the challenge of the insurgency. 
Human rights issues have assumed an increased 
significance, as one of the few available avenues 
through which the international community might be 
able to influence the resumption of the peace process. 
In this context the 61st Commission on Human Rights, 
meeting from 14 March to 22 April 2005, has a 
particularly important role.  
The priorities are to: 
 secure a strong resolution calling for restoration 
of basic freedoms and guaranteed protection; 
 ensure that the resolution has robust enforcement 
mechanisms, and compliance is measurable against 
clearly defined benchmarks; 
 put in place an effective UN human rights 
monitoring mission to complement and strengthen 
national efforts; 
 call for both the government and the Maoists to 
sign a Human Rights Accord (HRA) as a first 
confidence-building measure towards a resumed 
peace process; 
 ensure that any military assistance to the 
government, as well as new Royal Nepalese 
Army (RNA) participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations, is tied to concrete improvements in 
human rights; 
 use effective human rights monitoring as a 
means of engaging and exerting leverage on the 
Maoists; and 
 link human rights efforts to a wider, coordinated 
international push for peace, with a contact group 
of key powers and the UN supported by donors 
working on the development and rights tracks. 
This report describes the current human rights crisis, 
offers practical policy recommendations for tackling 
it by all relevant players, and explains how such 
measures would contribute to the longer-term conflict 
resolution effort. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Nepali Government: 
1. End the suspension of constitutional rights 
imposed since 1 February 2005 and: 
(a) release politicians, human rights defenders, 
journalists and others from preventive 
detention; 
(b) lift the state of emergency; and 
(c) remove media censorship to allow the 
reporting of human rights violations and 
honest war coverage. 
2. End the practice of enforced disappearances by 
security forces, investigate all disappearance 
cases and prosecute perpetrators. 
3. Renounce the use of vigilante groups, village 
militias and other extrajudicial means to contest 
the Maoists. 
4. Cooperate with the international community to 
tackle the human rights crisis by: 
(a) accepting a strong UN-led international 
human rights monitoring mission; 
(b) accepting appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur and issuing a standing invitation 
to the thematic mechanisms of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to visit 
Nepal; 
(c) allowing the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) to fulfil its mandate; 
and 
(d) encouraging the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) to accept standing 
offers of technical assistance from the 
international community. 
5. Take immediate steps to demonstrate concrete 
commitment to ending the culture of impunity 
towards human rights abusers by: 
(a) guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary and ensuring security forces' 
full cooperation with the courts; 
(b) prosecuting those responsible for the 
Doramba killings as demanded by the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in September 
2003; 
(c) investigating and prosecuting in the 
civilian courts other cases of alleged rights 
abuses, including gender-based violence; 
(d) issuing clear instructions to all security 
forces that any use of torture or other 
human rights violations will be punished; 
and 
(e) recognising that its National Human Rights 
Action Plan is an insufficient and 
inappropriate response to the current 
situation and urgently developing effective 
measures to address the human rights 
protection crisis. 
6. Strengthen the legal framework for human rights 
and international humanitarian law by: 
(a) signing the National Human Rights 
Commission's Human Rights Accord 
(HRA);  
(b) repealing or amending the Public Security 
Act and Terrorism and Destructive 
Activities Ordinance; 
(c) ensuring full compliance with existing 
commitments under domestic and 
international law; 
(d) signing the Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions; and 
(e) signing the Rome Statute on the International 
Criminal Court. 
7. Strengthen the capacity of the National Human 
Rights Commission by: 
(a) extending the term of the current 
Commissioners; 
(b) ensuring that the Commissioners and other 
NHRC officers are free to travel and fulfil 
their mandate; 
(c) respecting the physical integrity of its 
offices in Kathmandu, Biratnagar and 
Nepalgunj so it can protect sensitive 
information on victims and their relatives; 
and 
(d) ensuring that other agencies such as the 
Human Rights Promotion Centre and the 
security forces' human rights cells are 
not used to undermine its work. 
To the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
8. Cease human rights violations and adhere in full 
to international humanitarian law, in particular 
by: 
(a) respecting the rights of the civilian 
population and hors de combat security 
forces; 
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(b) releasing political detainees immediately; 
(c) halting the intimidation, torture and killing 
of political workers, journalists, activists 
and others; and 
(d) giving and enforcing clear instructions to 
all cadres on human rights and international 
humanitarian law. 
9. Build confidence and work towards the rapid 
resumption of the peace process by: 
(a) signing the Human Rights Accord; 
(b) cooperating with national and international 
human rights monitors; and 
(c) developing transparent methods for dealing 
with rights abuses, including gender-based 
violence. 
To the Member States of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR): 
10. Use the 61st CHR to address Nepal's human 
rights crisis by:  
(a) establishing an effective international 
human rights monitoring presence in the 
country through deployment of a clearly 
mandated mission of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
staffed by international monitors and 
national support staff sufficient to work 
across Nepal's difficult terrain and led by a 
head of mission of sufficient UN rank and 
ability to collate, evaluate and act on the 
information gathered by monitors; 
(b) appointing a Special Rapporteur; and 
(c) encouraging the royal government to 
issue a standing invitation to the thematic 
mechanisms of the Commission to visit 
Nepal. 
To the Wider International Community, including 
CHR Member States, Diplomatic Missions to 
Nepal, and Bilateral and Multilateral Donors: 
11. Use available leverage to end the culture of 
impunity by: 
(a) preparing to suspend the Royal Nepalese 
Army from UN peacekeeping operations 
if it does not improve its record; 
(b) making human rights protection a condition 
of military and other assistance; and  
(c) demonstrating that it is prepared, through 
the UN Security Council, to authorise the 
International Criminal Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over exceptionally serious 
violations of international humanitarian 
law by either the state or the Maoists 
unless such violations cease and/or are 
submitted to fair and impartial domestic 
investigation and prosecution. 
12. Support Nepal's National Human Rights 
Commission by: 
(a) demanding that the royal government 
respect its statute in both letter and spirit 
so it can fulfil its mandate; 
(b) insisting on the extension of the current 
Commissioners' terms; and 
(c) planning, funding and implementing (most 
probably through the UN) all appropriate 
assistance it requests. 
13. Help build non-governmental human rights 
capacity by: 
(a) defending and strengthening national 
human rights NGOs, including women's 
organisations, and relevant professional 
associations, such as the Nepal Bar 
Association and the Federation of Nepali 
Journalists; and 
(b) developing practical programs for 
protecting human rights defenders. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 24 March 2005 
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NEPAL: DEALING WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal is suffering a worsening human rights crisis as 
the nine-year-old Maoist (Communist Party of Nepal/ 
Maoist, CPN/M) insurgency intensifies. The royal coup 
of 1 February 2005, which imposed a state of emergency, 
has exacerbated an already dire situation.1 The weeks 
since 1 February have seen the arrest of hundreds of 
politicians, human rights defenders, journalists and 
others; an increase in clashes between rebels and state 
security forces; blockades by the Maoists2 and the 
continuation of their practices of abductions and 
extortion; severe press censorship and restrictions on 
monitoring efforts by the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC); and worrying signs of state-
sponsored vigilante action resulting in lynchings, the 
burning of villages and brutal Maoist retribution. An 18 
March 2005 statement by bilateral donors and the UN 
in Nepal has warned that "insecurity, armed activity and 
CPN/M blockades are pushing Nepal toward the abyss 
of a humanitarian crisis".3
As Crisis Group reporting has warned, the king's actions 
have made any resolution of the conflict much less likely. 
This analysis is shared by most of Nepal's powerful 
international friends.4 The increasing cycle of rights 
 
 
 
1 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°91, Nepal: Making a Bad 
Situation Worse, 9 February 2005, and Asia Briefing N°36, 
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, 24 February 2005. 
2 The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is for brevity 
referred to in this report as "the Maoists". 
3 Statement by bilateral donors and the United Nations in 
Nepal, 18 March 2005. The statement was signed by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
Denmark, the Department for International Development 
(DfID, UK), the European Commission, GTZ (Germany), 
SNV (Netherlands), SDC (Switzerland), the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), Finland, Norway, 
and the UN. See also "Nepal 'near humanitarian abyss'", 
BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4360019 
.stm. 
4 "We think that the king needs to move quickly to reinstate 
and protect civil and human rights, to release those who are 
detained under the state of emergency, and to begin a dialogue 
with the political parties intended to restore multi-party 
violations has undermined both sides' efforts to win 
popular support, and systemic abuses have sabotaged the 
Royal Nepalese Army's attempts at a "hearts and minds" 
campaign. Global concern at the deteriorating situation 
is virtually unanimous. Governments, multilateral 
bodies and international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have amplified the grave worries articulated by 
Nepali civil society groups and activists.5 Past failures to 
address the human rights crisis have not only allowed a 
culture of impunity for state security forces but also 
deprived the international community of potentially the 
most effective means of exerting serious pressure on the 
Maoists. 
The royal coup has, however, brought opportunities for 
fresh efforts to develop an effective, coordinated 
international response to the conflict. Well planned 
international pressure and assistance could both 
address the immediate political challenges and build 
toward a sustainable peace process. Steps to deal with 
the human rights crisis would also be confidence-
building measures -- the essential precursor to a 
 
democratic institutions under a constitutional monarchy", U.S. 
State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, State 
Department daily briefing 25 February, Washington D.C. "The 
developments in Nepal constitute a serious setback to 
democracy and bring the monarchy and mainstream political 
parties in direct confrontation with each other. This can only 
benefit the forces that not only wish to undermine democracy in 
Nepal but the institution of democracy as well", Indian Minister 
of External Affairs K Natwar Singh in a statement to the upper 
house of parliament, New Delhi, 4 March 2005. "We continue 
to urge the king to restore representative government and 
democratic freedoms. These are essential steps towards a 
sustainable peace process", UK Secretary of State Jack Straw, 
quoted by Bloomberg News, 23 February 2005. 
5 "Continued assistance will depend on demonstrated 
commitment and capacity to implement reforms", Wold Bank 
press statement, Washington D.C., 8 March 2005. The Bank 
suspended a $70 million loan for a poverty reduction scheme. 
"…Nepal is descending into an abyss of violence from which 
there will be no easy return. The rule of law, democracy and 
human rights: all of these are now stuff of mythology in 
Nepal", statement by Asian Human Rights Commission, 9 
March 2005, http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/ 
2005statements/273. Figures denoted in dollars ($) in this 
report refer to U.S. dollars.  
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negotiated settlement. The 61st Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR), meeting from 14 March to 22 
April 2005, should capitalise on these opportunities.  
This policy report outlines the broader political context 
of human rights in the conflict and details both the steps 
that should be taken, focusing particularly but not solely 
on the current CHR meeting, and their place in the 
peace process. It aims to complement the large body of 
published reporting by specialist human rights agencies 
and NGOs. The robust international response to the 
royal coup has demonstrated that there is a widely 
shared consensus on the need to help Nepal resolve its 
conflict. United political will can be effective. The 
challenge now is to build on the short-term consensus 
with forward-looking measures directed towards a 
negotiated long-term settlement. 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
The human rights situation has deteriorated dramatically 
since the end of the last ceasefire in August 2003. It is 
characterised by: 
 serious rights violations committed by both sides, 
Maoist and state, including for both 2003 and 
2004 the highest number of newly reported 
disappearances in any country;6 
 an atmosphere of impunity on both sides, with 
few restraints on combatants and extremely 
limited willingness to enforce military discipline 
in order to achieve observance of international 
humanitarian law; 
 an increasingly politicised military, which has 
exerted a stranglehold on peace talks without 
delivering security from Maoist attacks; 
 weak domestic capacity for monitoring and 
addressing rights violations; and, 
 an ineffective international response. 
The human rights crisis is, like other effects of the 
conflict, hitting the civilian population hardest. 
Disregard for human rights has also damaged the 
credibility and support base of both sides. 
The Maoists have targeted teachers, journalists and 
political workers and have used an array of violent and 
coercive tactics to intimidate and exploit the civilian 
population. Their atrocities -- many publicised by the 
journalists, activists and politicians detained following the 
royal coup -- have dented what public support the 
insurgents had. The Maoists may calculate that brutality 
serves them well at this stage of guerrilla warfare but it 
undermines their chances of ever earning mainstream 
acceptability and widespread support. Louise Arbour, UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), 
pointed this out during her January 2005 visit to Nepal: "I 
would warn the leaders of the insurgency not to misread 
developments in the wider world nor to believe that they 
can operate outside of the law".7
 
 
6 "Nepali security forces have established themselves as one 
of the world's worst perpetrators of enforced disappearances 
… According to [the] United Nations Working Group on 
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, in 2003 and 2004 
Nepal recorded the highest number of new cases of 
'disappearances' in the world", statement by Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 1 March 2005. 
7 Press statement on the occasion of the visit to Kathmandu 
(23-26 January 2005) by Ms. Louise Arbour, High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
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The state, especially if it is to deliver on the repeated 
promise of a "hearts and minds" campaign, does not 
have the luxury, legally or strategically, of disregarding 
its domestic and international responsibilities. Respect 
for human rights, as many military advisors have sought 
to remind the RNA, must lie at the core of any effort to 
restore faith in the state and government. State abuses, 
ever since the brutality of the police operations in Rolpa 
which preceded the insurgency, have fuelled popular 
resentment and played into the hands of the Maoists. 
There is increasing evidence that many of the several 
thousand people so far killed by the state, most in the 
period since the army's deployment in November 2001, 
were not Maoists or were executed in cold blood. 
Widespread detentions and intimidation of democratic 
politicians and human rights defenders have followed 
the proclamation on 1 February 2005 with which the 
King formalised his de facto assumption of absolute 
power. Censorship, restrictions on communication and 
movement and other measures mean that the full impact 
of the military takeover is unknown, even in the 
Kathmandu valley. Information from the 75 districts, 
many of which are practically cut off from the capital, 
may not be available for months. The full impact of the 
period immediately following 1 February will only 
become clear when measures have been taken to 
establish accurate monitoring of the situation. 
The donor community has repeatedly criticised the 
government's human rights record, calling for it and the 
Maoists to sign an HRA as recently as 9 September 
2004. That statement, from the major European donors, 
the European Commission delegation, the U.S. embassy 
and the Canadian mission to Nepal, asserted that "both 
sides to the conflict continue to be responsible for 
gruesome and continuing human rights violations". The 
European Union (EU) Troika which visited Nepal in 
December 2004 recalled, "the international community's 
appeals to both sides of the conflict to urgently sign the 
human rights accord as a first step towards curtailing the 
indiscriminate and arbitrary violation of rights".8 
Unfortunately, there has been little practical pressure for 
implementation of these appeals. Recent high-level 
visits, culminating in the UNHCHR's, have emphasised 
the gravity of the situation. Louise Arbour spoke of the 
"grave human rights crisis" afflicting Nepal and the 
"rampant abuse of basic human rights" brought about by 
the armed conflict.9
 
 
8 EU Troika press release, Kathmandu, 15 December 2004.  
9 Press statement, op. cit. 
A. A CATALOGUE OF ABUSES IN A CLIMATE 
OF IMPUNITY 
The main violations of human rights are widespread 
"disappearances", torture, extrajudicial killings, rapes, 
illegal and arbitrary detention and severe restrictions on 
freedom of assembly, speech, association and movement. 
Many have been thoroughly documented in reports by 
the major international human rights organisations.10 The 
judicial system is dysfunctional. The RNA, which has 
never been under effective civilian control or 
oversight, frequently ignores the Supreme Court habeas 
corpus orders, and there are many documented cases of 
re-arrest of those released by judicial order. 
The U.S. State Department's report on human rights 
practices emphasised that impunity on both sides 
remained a problem throughout 2004.11 According to 
Human Rights Watch, "Both parties have engaged in 
systematic human rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law with impunity".12 Placing 
Nepal at the top of the list of priorities for the CHR, 
 
10 Amnesty International's recent reports and statements on 
Nepal include: "Human rights defenders at risk", 18 November 
2004, ACT 30/020/2004; "Nepal: Human rights defenders 
under threat -- enhanced international protection urgently 
needed", 19 December 2004, ASA 31/190/2004; "Open letter 
condemning attacks on civilians, particularly those who 
criticise Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) (Maoist)", 10 
January 2005, ASA 31/003/2005; "Nepal: Killing with 
impunity", 20 January 2005, ASA 31/001/2005; "Nepal: State 
of emergency deepens human rights crisis", 1 February 2005, 
ASA 31/008/2005; "Nepal: A long ignored human rights crisis 
now on the brink of catastrophe", 18 February 2005, ASA 
31/022/2005. All are available at www.amnesty.org. Human 
Rights Watch reporting includes: "Nepal: Human Rights 
Concerns for the 61st Session of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights", 10 March 2005; "Clear Culpability: 
'Disappearances' by Security Forces in Nepal", 1 March 2005; 
"Nepal: Civil War Atrocities Follow Royal Takeover", 24 
February 2005; "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians 
Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War", 7 October 2004. All 
are available at www.hrw.org. International Commission of 
Jurists reports, including "Nepal: The Rule of Law 
Abandoned", 17 March 2005, are available at www.icj.org. 
Asian Human Rights Commission reports are available at 
www.achrweb.org. For a recent detailed account of human 
rights abuses, including gender-based violence, especially since 
1 February 2005, see, "Situation Update: Human Rights in 
Nepal", Nepal Coalition of Human Rights Defenders, 22 
March 2005.  
11 U.S. State Department, "Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 2004: Nepal", 28 February 2005, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41742.htm. 
12 "Nepal: Human Rights Concerns for the 61st Session of the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights", Human Rights Watch, 
op. cit. 
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Amnesty International's representative at the UN in 
Geneva, Peter Splinter, reiterated that "Nepal is on 
the verge of a human rights catastrophe -- basic human 
rights have been suspended; impunity is rampant. The 
international community must take immediate and 
decisive action to pull Nepal back from the verge".13 
Louise Arbour made the point most effectively: 
Regrettably, there is an alarming, and growing, 
number of cases in which the fundamental 
rights of the people of Nepal have been abused 
by agents of the state and in which victims 
have been unable to obtain redress. A climate 
of impunity prevails in this country as a result 
of which the rule of law, the fundamental glue 
of any society, is being worryingly eroded.14
This intervention in particular stung the military and 
led to an indignant rebuttal: 
[The] Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) has strongly 
objected to the term "impunity" used by various 
human rights organisations including UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Louis Arbour 
while associating the RNA with the deteriorating 
human rights situation in the country. RNA 
Spokesman Brigadier General Deepak Gurung 
during a regular press briefing in Kathmandu 
Friday [28 January] claimed that [the] RNA as a 
constitutional body is "very much conscious of 
human rights and has never gone beyond the 
limits of legal boundaries" to carry out its 
function in defence of the Monarchy, country and 
the people. "The word impunity is a loosely used 
word by various sources at various times to 
tarnish the image of the RNA", added Gurung.15
The best documented and most significant illustration 
of RNA impunity is the case of the killing of 21 people 
in the village of Doramba, Ramechhap district, on 17 
August 2003, the very day that the third round of peace 
talks got underway after a three-month hiatus. The 
NHRC set up a high-level enquiry team, which 
included a leading forensic doctor, two former Supreme 
Court judges and a prominent publisher, to look into the 
incident which the RNA had tried to portray as two 
Maoist ambushes. The enquiry found that the 21, most 
of whom were Maoists or sympathisers, had been 
detained for several hours before they were marched a 
 
 
13 "2005 UN Commission on Human Rights: An important 
opportunity to address human rights violations whenever 
and wherever they occur", Amnesty International press 
release, 10 March 2005. 
14 Press statement, op. cit. 
15 "RNA strongly objects to use of 'impunity' against it", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 28 January 2005. 
further two hours, then executed, most with shots to the 
head from close range while their hands were bound.16
The RNA reluctantly reopened its investigation and on 
31 January 2005, hours before the royal coup, announced 
that the major in charge of the operation would be 
removed from the army and imprisoned for two years for 
"excessive use of force".17 While this is a historic 
decision -- the first clear case of an RNA officer 
punished for a human rights violation -- the inadequate 
sentence, lack of transparency of the military trial and 
timing make the process very unsatisfactory. 
B. AN UNRESTRAINED AND POLITICISED 
MILITARY 
The army will now be under considerable pressure to 
make good its oft repeated promise that it will defeat the 
Maoists within six months. Given its clear inability over 
three years to hurt the ever more powerful Maoist forces, 
there is a great danger civilians will continue to bear the 
brunt of government military operations. The RNA fully 
controls both the national police and the paramilitary 
Armed Police Force and in effect rules the 75 district 
headquarters, which have become increasingly 
militarised, with local military commanders holding 
sway over the nominal civilian local power, Chief 
District Officers. 
The military's arbitrary detentions have been "legalised" 
by the Terrorist and Destructive Activities Ordinance 
(TADO), signed by the government of Prime Minister 
Deuba in October 2004. Intensified conflict is now to be 
expected, and the probable result is an increasingly 
polarised society. Many civilians who are trying to stay 
out of the conflict will be forced by the security forces 
into the arms of the Maoists. This will make the search 
for peace more difficult and the civilian population 
increasingly vulnerable to violations of their rights. 
In mid-2004, the RNA made public its wish to set up a 
military bank.18 The army's senior officers already 
control a sizeable welfare fund based on earnings from 
UN peacekeeping duties. It runs petrol pumps as a 
 
16 The NHRC report on Doramba is available at 
http://insn.org/index.php?p=303. 
17 The dismissal was confirmed on 13 February 2005. "Army 
major sacked over Doramba case", The Rising Nepal, 14 
February 2005, available at http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/ 
pageloader.php?file=2005/02/14//topstories/main7. 
18 Though the news was reported in the press in August 2004, 
Minister for Information and Communication Mohammed 
Mohsin later denied that the government had given permission 
to the RNA to open a bank. "None of their business", Nepali 
Times, 20 August 2004. 
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commercial enterprise but its accounts and other 
activities remain murky, and the army has resisted 
public scrutiny.19 The army also has its own schools and 
hospitals while hundreds, if not thousands, of rank and 
file soldiers are used as domestic servants by both 
serving and retired senior officers.20 The international 
community has largely turned a blind eye to RNA 
efforts to increase its economic independence. But 
further moves toward entrenching the military as a state 
within a state are deeply disturbing, as the experiences 
of Pakistan and Indonesia indicate.21
C. LIMITED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION CAPACITY 
State mechanisms for human rights protection are at 
best dysfunctional and at worst actually designed to fail. 
Outside of government mechanisms, the human rights 
movement has been severely weakened by measures 
since the 1 February coup. Press restrictions and curbs 
on expression have made it almost impossible to do 
effective human rights monitoring. 
The statutory body for protection of human rights, the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), is a 
relatively weak institution that has not received 
government support since its creation in 2000. It and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have 
been regularly refused unhindered access to detainees, 
particularly those the RNA holds with dubious legality. 
The population outside Kathmandu has increasingly 
turned its back on the judicial system. Measures 
suspending basic constitutional rights and empowering 
the security forces in effect make it impossible for 
Nepalis to carry out human rights defence activities 
without unacceptable risk. 
1. The National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) 
The NHRC is the main institutional defender of human 
rights. Its recent successes in documenting violations, 
notably the Doramba massacre, have made it the target 
of official ire, and commissioners have been under 
considerable pressure. Over the previous eighteen 
 
 
19 In August 2003, ex-RNA soldiers held a press conference 
in Kathmandu claiming massive misuse of the welfare fund 
by senior officers. "Ex-servicemen accuse RNA of welfare 
fund misuse", The Kathmandu Post, 22 August 2003. 
20 Called pipas, these RNA personnel are usually recruited 
from the untouchable castes and assigned as domestic servants 
and other support staff of RNA officers. They have nominal 
rights and are rarely promoted through the conventional ranks. 
21 See, for example, Crisis Group Asia Report N°40, 
Pakistan: Transition to Democracy, 3 October 2002. 
months, the credibility and capacity of the NHRC had 
been significantly improved through technical assistance, 
training and advice on monitoring techniques. However, 
the limitations imposed since 1 February have severely 
weakened its capacity to carry out its mandate. It remains, 
nonetheless, a key partner for donors and any UN 
monitoring mission. The mandate of the current 
commissioners expires on 25 May 2005. The international 
community must ensure that the commissioner appointment 
process follows the spirit and letter of the founding statute, 
but without a parliament, there is no legal way for new 
commissioners to be nominated. Ironically, the NHRC 
has become a severe irritant to the RNA since the U.S. 
Congress passed legislation late in 2004 which makes 
Washington's military aid to Nepal contingent on the 
army's cooperation with the NHRC.22 The temptation for 
the regime to end NHRC independence, therefore, is 
considerable.  
2. The Judiciary 
While the NHRC is constrained by the government, the 
judiciary has remained ineffective due partly to its own 
shortcomings.23 Even before the royal coup, the RNA 
routinely ignored writs.24 When they were accepted, as in 
a few habeas corpus petitions, detainees released by the 
courts were promptly re-arrested, sometimes within the 
court compound.25 Given this, it is unsurprising that the 
courts have been meek about pushing the legal 
boundaries in the present emergency. A case in point is 
the Supreme Court's refusal to register cases even 
under constitutional provisions not suspended by the 
emergency.26  
 
22 The amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations 
bill sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy restricts military aid to 
Nepal unless the Secretary of State certifies that it is cooperating 
with the NHRC to resolve all disappearance cases; granting the 
NHRC unimpeded access to places of detention; and complying 
promptly with habeas corpus orders issued by Nepal's Supreme 
Court, including all outstanding orders. 
23 For a comprehensive examination of the urgent legal and 
judicial challenges facing Nepal see "Nepal: The Rule of Law 
Abandoned", International Commission of Jurists, 17 March 
2005. 
24 "Senadvara Sarvocchalai dhantiyo", Kantipur, 22 March 
2004. 
25 "The police and army often refuse to accept court orders to 
produce detainees, and re-arrest detainees immediately after 
the courts order their release", "NHRC of Nepal amidst the 
ruins", Suhas Chakma, Himal South Asian, Kathmandu, 
March--April 2004, available at http://www.himalmag.com/ 
2004/march_april/report_2.htm. Human Rights Watch, "Clear 
culpability: disappearances by security forces in Nepal", op. 
cit. 
26 The Supreme Court is currently considering writ that raises 
the question whether it can take up cases under non-
Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005 Page 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Nepal's judiciary has always been constrained by royal 
prerogative. Nevertheless, during the partyless Panchayat 
system from 1960 to 1990, the judiciary won a certain 
reputation for taking up cases of political detainees and 
often ruling in their favour. Ironically, the democracy 
years since 1990 did much to damage the independence 
of the courts. The seminal case of the period, the 
dissolution of parliament by a communist prime 
minister in 1995, led to verdicts that institutionalised 
horse-trading in parliament and general political 
instability.27 It also led to the politicisation of the courts. 
Certain judges were openly seen as tilting towards a 
particular political party. 
Since then, the slide has been relentless. The first 
emergency rule, imposed in November 2001, allowed 
the security forces to seize initiative from the judiciary. 
An RNA official complained in early 2004, "We 
arrested the Maoists but the courts released them due to 
lack of proof or other reasons. So what were we to do? 
We arrested them again from the court compounds".28 
The courts have not faced up to the RNA challenge. 
While Supreme Court justices have reprimanded the 
RNA a few times, they have rarely followed up with 
action. In the current climate, there is even less reason to 
hope that the courts will dare order the RNA to behave. 
Much of the reason for this is the judiciary's traditional 
deference towards the monarchy. Nepal's 1990 
constitution bars any cases against the royal family, a 
point zealously enforced by the courts. Another 
important reason is a selection method for justices and 
judges which gives the palace final say. Since the king 
has shown determination to push his own candidates in 
other constitutional bodies,29 his shadow looms large 
over the courts. Just how large is illustrated by another 
recent case. Before the February coup, the coalition 
government was in turmoil over the issue of calling 
 
 
suspended constitutional provisions. The writ was filed after 
the Court refused to entertain a petition under the non-
suspended article 88(2) of the constitution. It is expected to 
deliver a verdict on 31 March 2005. "Amicus Curiae 
concludes debate", The Kathmandu Post, 8 March 2005. 
27 The Supreme Court verdict restored a dissolved parliament 
and stated that the legislature cannot be dissolved until all 
possibilities of forming an alternative government have been 
exhausted. The decision encouraged deal-making between 
parties and politicians seeking to lure rivals into supporting 
attempts to form a new government.  
28 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, February 2004. 
29 King Gyanendra appointed Keshab Raj Rajbhandary as 
Chief Election Commissioner on 3 December 2003, 
www.nepalnews.com. The selection was made after the 
monarch asked for a shortlist of three names to choose from, 
not the usual one name. Crisis Group interview, December 
2003. 
elections or reviving the dissolved House of 
Representatives.30 The Nepal Bar Association met Chief 
Justice Govinda Bahadur Shrestha in November 2004 to 
press for a speedy hearing on reviving parliament. He 
concurred with the need but nothing happened.31 Shrestha 
retired soon after, and the royal coup made the issue 
moot. A Bar member says, "the justices are just too afraid 
of going against the palace's wishes. There were clear 
indications from the palace not to hear the case".32 In its 
present state, the judiciary simply lacks the will and 
wherewithal to protect human rights. 
3. National Human Rights NGOs 
National human rights NGOs in Nepal are active but 
relatively weak and inexperienced. Their lack of security 
awareness has made them particularly vulnerable to the 
measures adopted since the King's seizure of power. The 
fact that a number of key human rights defenders have 
either left the country or gone underground underlines the 
difficulty citizens have in documenting human rights 
cases and the need for international monitoring and a 
significantly expanded presence of the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 
Nepal. Human rights defenders in Kathmandu, including 
journalists, lawyers and NGO workers, have clearly 
expressed their fears to diplomats and visiting 
delegations.33 Some leading human rights defenders have 
been detained on their return to Nepal and others turned 
back from the airport.34  
Leaders of most mainstream parties remain under house 
arrest while hundreds of other party cadres and student 
activists were detained in an attempt to prevent protests at 
the royal takeover, suggesting that the main target of the 
new administration is less the Maoists than key politicians, 
human rights defenders, the media and the Kathmandu 
intelligentsia. The Deuba government presented no 
 
30 The House, the elected lower chamber of parliament, was 
dissolved in May 2002 due to in-fighting within the ruling 
Nepali Congress party. Since then, Nepal has had no 
elections, even though the constitution mandates these within 
six months of dissolution of parliament. 
31 "CJ willing to hear plea on House revival", The Himalayan 
Times, 25 November 2004. 
32 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
33 Federation of Nepalese Journalists president Taranath 
Dahal has said he fears for his safety in the current climate. 
Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
34 The chairman of Child Workers in Nepal, Gauri Pradhan, a 
leading child rights advocate, was arrested at Kathmandu 
airport on 17 February 2005 upon his return from Europe. 
Political scientist and former ambassador to India, Professor 
Lok Raj Baral, was arrested upon returning from Delhi on 7 
February. Prominent editor and publisher Kanak Mani Dixit 
was arrested on 7 March, two days after returning from India. 
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practical obstacle to the RNA's prosecution of the war 
against the Maoists. But the palace and army were 
angered by the growing international attention reflected 
in a marked increase in media coverage of human rights 
violations, a phenomenon they blamed on the media and 
human rights defenders.35
D. INEFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
As in its approach to the conflict as a whole, the 
international community's policy on human rights in 
Nepal has failed. Neighbours and donors have always 
been soft on government human rights abuses 
because they felt the government was at least a lesser 
evil than the Maoists. This has left them poorly 
positioned to say much now that the government's 
approach is clearly out of control. 
Indeed, the palace and military view their present 
actions as a logical extension of the practices which 
the international community largely ignored as the 
political crisis intensified over the last several years, 
starting with the first time the king dismissed Prime 
Minister Deuba and assumed executive control, in 
October 2002. If the Maoists had killed 21 soldiers in 
cold blood on the first day of the third round of the 
2003 peace talks, international outcry would have 
been justified and likely. The turning of a blind eye 
to many state abuses and the gentle approach of 
offering training and technical assistance rather than 
demanding a change in policy from the top 
encouraged further deterioration of the situation. 
The period since the breakdown of the ceasefire in 
August 2003, and in particular the twelve months 
since the 2004 Commission on Human Rights, has 
been one of missed opportunities.36 International 
efforts have come too late and on a scale which has 
proved inadequate to make an impression on the 
impunity enjoyed by the RNA and the Maoists alike. 
The Maoists were not tested when they proclaimed 
themselves ready to accept international human rights 
monitoring; nor were they tested on their willingness 
 
 
35 Crisis Group interviews February 2005. The royal 
government has also barred rights advocates from travelling 
outside Kathmandu. NHRC Commissioner Sushil Pyakurel 
was stopped from flying to Rupandehi on 5 March 2005 to 
investigate reports of vigilantism in Kapilvastu. Another 
NHRC commissioner, Kapil Shrestha, was barred from 
attending the opening of the NHRC's Biratnagar office on 7 
February 2005. Former Speaker of Parliament Daman Nath 
Dhungana was turned back on 10 March 2005 from the airport 
while trying to board a flight to attend an academic seminar on 
Nepal in the United States, www.kantipuronline.com. 
36 See Section IV below. 
to participate in peace talks with UN or other 
international facilitation. Similarly, the government's 
commitment paper of 26 March 2004 was welcomed 
by diplomats and used to justify keeping Nepal off the 
agenda at the 2004 CHR, but there was no effort to 
monitor and hold the government to its terms.37 At this 
stage of an increasingly dirty war, it is not justifiable 
to take either side at its word. 
International concern over the human rights situation 
had grown in the months prior to the royal coup. In 
December 2004, the UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances visited and concluded 
that "the phenomenon of disappearances in Nepal 
today is widespread: its use by the Maoist insurgents 
and the Nepalese security forces is arbitrary".38 This 
was followed by a statement on 24 December by UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan calling on the 
government to protect human rights defenders after 
reports surfaced of an RNA "hit list", which included 
leading members of civil society.39
The international community needs to recognise that its 
previous stance was unsuccessful and adopt a much more 
realistic approach to the current situation. There is no 
need to change the frequently reiterated objectives of 
pressing and assisting both sides to abide by international 
humanitarian law and human rights norms. But the 
consistent failure to achieve any progress towards these 
objectives calls for a fresh start. 
 
37 "His Majesty's Government's commitment on the 
implementation of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law" was produced during the 2004 CHR 
discussions. The five-page document contained 25 
commitments, such as the guarantee that, "No-one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Measures will be 
undertaken to prevent illegal or arbitrary detention and forced 
disappearances". 
38 Advanced edited version of the report of the UN Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances visit to 
Nepal, 6-14 December 2004, paragraph 25, E/CN.4/2005/65/ 
Add.1, 28 January 2005. 
39 The Secretary General's statement was cited in "Annan 
iterates concern and offer on Nepal", The Himalayan Times, 
25 December 2004. 
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III. THE ROYAL COUP AND BEYOND 
King Gyanendra's dismissal of a coalition 
government and seizure of complete power have 
been examined in earlier Crisis Group publications.40 
The situation remains tense and uncertain. The royal 
government has been fortunate that the mainstream 
political parties have not aligned themselves directly 
with the Maoists yet but many politicians warn that 
continued assault on political and civil liberties can 
only hasten that eventuality.41 There are already signs 
that the parties are increasingly sympathetic towards 
the Maoists' main demand of converting Nepal into a 
republic.42 The human rights crisis has further 
narrowed the democratic middle ground and 
escalated abuses and threatens to intensify the 
conflict. Vigilantism by government-backed militias 
in Kapilvastu district indicates willing disregard of 
the rule of law by the state. The Maoists have stepped 
up blockades, strikes and military attacks, while 
softening their tone towards the political parties and 
allowing their cadres to work in rural areas.  
At the royal government's first press conference, on 17 
March 2005, Vice Chairman Peter Giri43 demanded the 
political parties "comply with the king's call to seek a 
political way out of the current situation". Toward the 
Maoists his language was stronger and clearer: 
As for the Maoists, Giri ruled out peace talks 
with them until they disarmed. "We are not in 
the mood to hold talks with them", he said. 
"Whatever you term them, they are terrorists". 
He, however, called on the Maoists to abandon 
violence and "terrorist" activities and join 
mainstream politics. "The situation in the 
country has changed", he said. "They will get 
no benefit by struggling from the jungles". He 
said that if they did not do so, the security 
forces were fully equipped and committed to 
wiping out the Maoists.44
 
 
 
40 See fn. 1 above. 
41 Crisis Group interviews with Nepali politicians in exile, 
Delhi, February 2005. 
42 "Nepal: Political parties compromise with Maoists, vow 
fight to end", Inter Press Service, Bangkok, 15 March 2005. 
43 Veteran royalist politician Tulsi Giri took the name "Peter" 
when he converted from Hinduism to become a Jehova's 
Witness. 
44 "Vice Chairman Giri extends olive branch to parties", 17 
March 2005, www.kantipuronline.com. 
A. ARRESTS, DISAPPEARANCES, MILITARY 
ACTIONS 
At the start of the king's coup on 1 February, security 
forces began arresting politicians, student leaders and 
human rights defenders. By the time King Gyanendra 
spoke over state radio and television, soldiers were 
guarding sensitive installations and government 
buildings. The minute the king finished, arrests were 
intensified. Hundreds of politicians were picked up in the 
first hours. Human rights defenders were harassed or put 
under surveillance. By the second day, when Gyanendra 
announced a council of ministers with himself at its head, 
it was clear the army was running the country, issuing 
orders ranging from news censorship to warnings against 
political protests. RNA headquarters was the centre of 
activity. "The cabinet is just a façade", said a journalist 
with close ties to the army.45
In the days following, as the Maoists prepared to take 
advantage, the military was stretched on two fronts: not 
only conducting a badly-run counterinsurgency 
campaign but also doing police work, detaining 
politicians and protestors and keeping Kathmandu's 
streets free of opposition activity. The result was that the 
Maoist blockade of the capital beginning 13 February 
was effective despite RNA escorts of convoys. "Our 
convoy came under attack from the rebels even though 
there were RNA vehicles escorting us, foot patrols at 
every kilometre along the highway and military 
helicopters overhead", said a journalist who travelled 
from Gorkha to Kathmandu.46
Its military strategy a failure and international 
condemnation mounting, the RNA turned inwards. 
Though censorship has made it difficult to know the true 
extent of rights violations after 1 February, especially 
outside Kathmandu, a few cases have come to light. A 
reporter with a prominent publication was abducted in 
early March in what was first claimed to be a Maoist 
operation. It later transpired that the reporter was carried 
off by the security forces.47 Protestors in Jhapa were 
arrested by soldiers and severely tortured in the RNA 
barracks at Chaarali. In the most egregious violations 
since the coup, security forces have been implicated in 
vigilante killings and arson in Kapilvastu district during 
February. A foreign journalist who visited a few days 
later reported they had encouraged villagers to kill fellow 
 
45 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 5 February 2005. 
46 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, February 2005. 
47 Himal Khabarpatrika reporter J.B. Pun Magar was 
abducted in Lumbini on 10 March 2005. The magazine later 
said he was taken away not by Maoists but by security forces. 
Pun was released the following day after domestic and 
international criticism of his abduction. 
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villagers and burn scores of houses of alleged Maoist 
sympathisers.48
The royal government changed tack in early March 
after it became clear that no major donor country or 
institution supported its concerted assaults on democracy, 
civil liberties and human rights. In an effort to placate 
international opinion, it began releasing prominent 
detainees.49 But arbitrary arrests have continued, and 
there is concern that disappearances and torture are still 
employed as well.50 Killings of purported Maoist 
activists have also continued, though in the absence of 
any independent confirmation the identities of those 
killed and the circumstances of their deaths cannot be 
established.51
B. CENSORSHIP AND SUSPENSION OF OTHER 
RIGHTS 
Emergency rule since 1 February has ended press 
freedom. FM radio stations have been ordered to desist 
from broadcasting news altogether.52 Print outlets and 
television stations are monitored by government censors. 
Though military censors were withdrawn from news 
organisations after the first few days, stringent 
guidelines have been issued to discourage independent 
coverage of political and conflict issues. A senior 
journalist says, "We can't report anything about the 
 
 
48 "Nepal backed lynch mob rampage", The Telegraph, 
London, 12 March 2005. Available at http://insn.org/wp-
content/BellKapilvastu.pdf. 
49 Dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and 
twenty others were freed on 11 March 2005. Several other 
prominent politicians were released earlier, but at least three 
top politicians -- party leaders Girija Prasad Koirala (Nepali 
Congress), Madhav Nepal (CPN-UML) and Amik Sherchan 
(Janamorcha) -- remain under house arrest. 
50 "Government extends house arrest of leaders", The 
Kathmandu Post, 4 March 2005; "Parties stage protest, 
hundreds arrested,", The Kathmandu Post, 9 March 2005; 
"Journalist arrested", The Kathmandu Post, 9 March 2005; 
"Four student leaders arrested", The Kathmandu Post, 14 
March 2005; "Over 750 protestors arrested nationwide", The 
Kathmandu Post, 15 March 2005; "Channel Nepal scribe 
arrested", The Kathmandu Post, 15 March 2005. See also, 
"Situation Update: Human Rights in Nepal", op. cit. 
51 An editor of a leading daily newspaper said that his 
reporters in the district have been ordered to file only news 
released by the local security forces. They are not allowed to 
make their own independent investigations. Crisis Group 
interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
52 The ban on radio station news has jeopardised the livelihood 
of over 1,000 journalists nationwide. Crisis Group interviews 
with journalists, Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ) 
officials and radio station operators, Kathmandu, February-
March 2005. 
RNA or Maoists without vetting it with the security 
forces".53  
Even so, because of the international limelight, the press 
in Kathmandu has been gradually pushing at its 
boundaries. Authorities have released a few high-profile 
journalists,54 and newspapers and magazines have started 
reporting on political and conflict issues without consulting 
censors. On 16 March Kathmandu and district branches 
of the Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ) petitioned 
the government and local district administration offices to 
restore freedom of expression.55 While this suggests gradual 
relaxation of censorship, the situation in the districts -- 
where journalists were squeezed by both the government 
and Maoists even before the coup -- is much worse. 
Editors and journalists have been arrested for writing on 
political issues and also for protesting press restrictions, 
and several vernacular weeklies and dailies have been 
shut down.  
Reporters Sans Borders (RSF) on 14 March listed Nepal 
among the countries with the most imprisoned 
journalists.56 "The journalists in the districts face far 
greater constraints than in Kathmandu. They are the ones 
facing the brunt of the emergency", another editor says.57 
Even in Kathmandu, relaxation of censorship is a mirage. 
The editor of Kantipur, the leading Nepali-language 
daily, was summoned by the district police office on 17 
March to answer about news coverage in his paper.  
Since 1 February, freedom of association, travel, right to 
property and other civil liberties except the right to habeas 
corpus petitions have been suspended. This has affected 
political gatherings and efforts to probe rights abuses. An 
NHRC commissioner was stopped at the Kathmandu 
airport in early March from flying to Rupandehi to 
investigate allegations of vigilante justice in Kapilvastu 
district. Former Speaker of Parliament Daman Nath 
Dhungana was barred from flying to the U.S. Altogether, 
about 200 politicians, human rights defenders, civil 
society leaders, intellectuals and journalists have been put 
on a list barring them from leaving Kathmandu.58 Many 
 
53 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, February-March 2005. 
54 FNJ General Secretary Bishnu Nishthuri was released on 26 
February 2005 after 21 days in detention, as was Kanak Dixit 
on the night of 7 March after being detained for five hours. 
55 Kantipur, 17 March 2005. 
56 "Reporters Sans Frontiers has put Nepal among countries 
with the largest number of imprisoned journalists. Nine out of 
73 jailed journalists are in Nepal", www.kantipuronline.com, 
15 March 2005. "FNJ calls for freedom of expression", 
www.nepalnews.com, 16 March 2005.  
57 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
58 Crisis Group interview with police officer, Kathmandu, 
March 2005. 
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only learn of this when they are turned away from the 
airport. 
C. VIGILANTE ACTION: A REVIVAL OF 
THE VILLAGE MILITIAS PLAN? 
The government first announced its intention to 
introduce village militias to counter Maoists in 
November 2003. Domestic and international outcry -- 
including from Crisis Group59-- over the start of the 
program in Sudama village of Sarlahi district forced it 
to shelve the plan. However, the military continued 
quietly developing the concept. Sporadic reports from 
eastern Nepal in early 2004 indicated the RNA had 
armed and trained villagers in Chulachuli and Larumba 
villages of Ilam district. In Jhapa, Sunsari, Morang, 
Dhanusha and Dhankuta, local journalists and 
intellectuals told Crisis Group they knew of RNA 
encouragement and training for villagers to use armed 
force to counter the Maoists.60 Though the RNA denied 
it had such a policy, the now well-documented rampage 
by vigilantes in the Kapilvastu district indicates the 
government is again backing proxy militias. 
From 17 February 2005, mobs beat and burned to death 
at least 31 supposed Maoists or Maoist sympathisers. 
Their actions were actively condoned by the local 
security forces and then lauded by government 
ministers. In the following weeks, local and international 
journalists, human rights investigators and others have 
been able to confirm details. The BBC reported: 
At the height of the violence, three government 
ministers came to address a crowd. Home Affairs 
Minister Dan Bahadur Shahi says he knew they 
had beaten twelve men to death. "I encouraged 
their self-defence system", he told the BBC. 
"Why shouldn't I, when the Maoists massacred 
the people and burned their properties?" 
Recourse to the courts "is not relevant during a 
war", he continued. "They gathered, found them 
and killed them. I thought I should praise them". 
"Legally what these people are doing is a bad 
thing. But it was done by the crowd", says 
Major Sunil Gahle at a makeshift barracks in 
Ganeshpur village. "The Maoists started their 
looting and all these bad things, so the people 
started this type of protection for themselves", 
 
 
59 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°30, Nepal: Dangerous 
Plans for Village Militias, 17 February 2004. 
60 Crisis Group interviews, 2004. 
he said, predicting the government might soon 
distribute firearms to villagers.61
Maoists subsequently retaliated and killed eleven people 
who, they claimed, were vigilante leaders. Journalists 
and rights investigators who travelled to the area after the 
carnage reported the complicity of security forces in 
encouraging villagers to use violence against suspected 
Maoist sympathisers. A confidential report prepared by 
rights monitors says, "In order to counter Maoist 
violence, up to now villagers have burnt down over 600 
houses in various Village Development Committees of 
Kapilvastu district and have killed at least 46 persons. 
Tens of thousands of other villagers have been displaced 
from their homes to across the border in India".62  
The Maoists are not without blame in the incident, 
which, rights investigators found, started after they 
abducted two residents of Ganeshpur village. Efforts 
to release the two spiralled out of control, resulting in 
widespread arson, looting and murder.  
Based on interviews with the Chief District Officer and 
the RNA major at the Ganeshpur temporary base camp, 
the investigators concluded that the security forces 
indirectly aided the vigilantes by marching behind them. 
They tried to take control over the vigilantes only after 
they had gone out of control. The violence, mostly carried 
out by the majority plains community, appears to have 
targeted villagers from hill communities. The report warns 
that "there is clear danger that this conflagration could 
soon lead to further communal violence". Suhas Chakma, 
director of the Asian Human Rights Commission, stated 
that, "The lynching of 22 alleged Maoists and burning down 
of about 700 houses of the alleged Maoists sympathisers 
in Kapilvastu district from 17 to 23 February 2005 by the 
RNA and vigilante groups must be investigated by an 
international commission of inquiry".63  
At the royal government's first press conference, Minister 
for Information and Communications Tanka Dhakal 
reiterated government support for the vigilantes: "The 
people have been forced to come out with courageous 
retaliatory measures for peace. The government supports 
such people and promises that in areas where people 
 
61 "Nepal's rising vigilante violence", BBC News, 14 March 
2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south 
_asia/4346597.stm. 
62 Unpublished 38-page report by a committee of senior 
human rights experts. 
63 Asian Human Rights Commission Press Release PR/NEP/ 
03/03/05 "War crimes in Nepal", 14 March 2005, available at 
http://www.achrweb.org/press/2005/NEP030305.htm. 
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have come with retaliatory measures, the government 
will carry out [an] integrated development package".64
Fears over the implications of vigilante action have 
been widespread ever since the village militia plans 
were first announced in 2003. Given Nepal's complex 
caste and ethnic composition and the array of festering 
grievances harboured by diverse groups, vigilante 
action could trigger communal and ethnic riots. 
Villagers armed by the government could easily label 
personal or political enemies as Maoist sympathisers 
and take advantage of the lawless environment to 
pursue their own agendas. The elimination of remaining 
neutral space would force the population to choose one 
side or the other; quite possibly they would be targeted 
by both. As the BBC concluded: "Maoist violence and 
misdirected counter-violence are taking on a frightening 
life of their own. And the king's government is 
encouraging the vigilantes".65
D. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Most of the international community has spoken with 
one voice on the immediate challenges for Nepal 
following 1 February. While the royal coup has been 
endorsed by Pakistan, North Korea and Cuba, and 
described as Nepal's internal affair by Russia and China, 
most other nations have demanded a fast return to 
democracy. This message has been sent most forcefully 
by the RNA's principal suppliers of military aid: India, 
the U.S. and the UK. During U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice's visit to New Delhi on 16 March 
2005, she and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh 
explicitly agreed to work together to help restore 
democracy. Secretary Rice said the Nepali government 
needed get back on a democratic path: "That simply 
must happen … it needs to happen very, very soon".66
Respect for human rights is at the core not only of the 
democratic process but also of national development 
efforts, including those funded by donors. Despite some 
early mixed signals -- such as the Asian Development 
Bank's signing of a large loan deal on the day following 
the coup67 -- most donors have issued warnings about 
 
 
64 Press conference, Kathmandu, 17 March 2005. 
65 "Nepal's rising vigilante violence", BBC News, op. cit 
66 "Rice lauds India-Pakistan peace", BBC News, 16 March 
2005. 
67 "ADB has pledged $121 million for Nepal to gear up its 
development initiatives. The ADB has unveiled this in its 
country strategy program 2005-09", The Rising Nepal, 28 
February 2005. However, ADB country director S. Hafeez 
Rehman stated that, "In view of the recent political and 
the likely implications of the coup. On 14 March, World 
Bank Country Director for Nepal Ken Ohashi said that 
running development projects in the absence of a free 
press would be difficult and warned that it would hard to 
speed up development under current circumstances.68 
This followed a strong World Bank statement on 8 
March: 
The Board expressed concerns about the security 
situation in Nepal and the implementability of 
projects. The Board also raised concerns about 
the government's ability to continue 
implementing difficult reforms in the absence of 
representative mechanisms to build broad-based 
consensus. But it broadly supported the cautious 
approach proposed by management. Management 
noted the Board's concerns and will continue to 
consult closely with other development partners in 
assessing the progress that the government makes 
in reform implementation, as well as issues 
related to the broader governance environment 
of the country, including the rule of law and 
protection of human rights.69
Following expressions of concern about the suspension of 
democratic processes and rights by other European 
nations, the Finnish embassy in Kathmandu underlined 
that future assistance was being jeopardised. Addressing a 
program in the western Baglung district, Chargé 
d'Affaires Pauli Mustonen reminded his audience that 
Finland had invested in human rights after the restoration 
of Nepali democracy in 1990. But he cautioned that 
Finnish assistance would depend on democratic stability: 
"Development is impossible in any country without 
democracy".70 Failure to tackle the human rights crisis 
will not only enable the continuation of abuses but 
endanger Nepal's development for years to come. 
 
security developments in Nepal, ADB is reviewing the 
implications for its operation in Nepal". Indo Asian News 
Service, 2 March 2005, available at http://www.eians.com/ 
stories/2005/03/02/02sin.shtml. 
68 "Development work not possible without free press: 
Ohashi", www.katipuronline.com, 15 March 2005. 
69 World Bank Statement on Nepal: "Continued Assistance 
Will Depend On Demonstrated Commitment And Capacity 
To Implement Reforms", News Release No:2005/372/SAR, 
Washington D.C., 8 March 2005. 
70 "Finland says aid dependent on democratic stability", 
www.katipuronline.com, 15 March 2005. 
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IV. 2003-2004: A YEAR OF MISSED 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Despite significantly increased attention towards the 
role of human rights in Nepal's crisis, the period since 
the collapse of the last ceasefire in August 2003 has 
been one of missed opportunities: failure to insist on the 
proper prosecution of the Doramba case; slow and 
misguided use of technical assistance; lack of follow-up 
on the Chair's statement at the 2004 Commission on 
Human Rights; and no testing of the Maoists' offers to 
accept international monitoring. The many internationally-
backed initiatives have had no measurable positive 
impact. They have been too small to challenge impunity 
or bring the warring parties back to the peace table. 
A. THE DORAMBA CASE 
The Doramba killings of unarmed Maoists in custody 
described above gave the authorities a major opportunity 
to impress on the RNA that the war must be fought 
according to international law and to begin to end 
military impunity. The failure to insist on satisfactory 
prosecution sent the dangerous message that no one 
need be held accountable even when there was a 
watertight investigation of a major war crime. 
The Doramba massacre was more than just a violation 
of the law of armed combat: it unambiguously 
demonstrated that the military had been given licence to 
derail the peace process. The orders for the mass 
extrajudicial executions can only have come from a 
high level. Although the RNA has attributed exclusive 
responsibility to the major in command, it is clear his 
actions were sanctioned by superiors: if he had really 
been a rogue operative sabotaging a sincere effort at 
talks his punishment would have been swift and harsh. 
Doramba illustrated that the military was empowered to 
use mass executions as a deliberate strategy to undermine 
peace talks. In combination with the weight of evidence 
regarding other international humanitarian law violations 
by the RNA it confirmed that abuses were not a result 
of indiscipline or poor training but systemic and at the 
very least acquiesced in by the senior officer corps. 
B. LEVERAGE ON THE MAOISTS 
In January 2004, the Maoist leadership, stung by 
Amnesty International's sharp criticism of the 
movement's human rights record, made a clear 
statement that it would accept international human 
rights monitoring.71 This was an ideal opportunity for 
the international community to demand a series of 
measures, such as signature of the Human Rights 
Accord (HRA), as proposed by the NHRC in May 
2003. But the Maoists were not challenged and tested 
to deliver on their promise.  
Until the HRA or a similar agreement is signed, discourse 
on human rights will be futile and circular, with the 
Maoists and the palace exchanging charges and 
impugning each other's sincerity. Were the government to 
sign the HRA, it might force the Maoists also to accept 
concrete, verifiable commitments and face the 
consequences of non-compliance. UN involvement 
sanctioned by the HRA would also importantly leave the 
Maoists with no chance to claim their foot-dragging on 
peace talks was due to lack of international involvement. 
C. COMMITMENT PAPER AS FIG-LEAF 
The government's commitment paper of March 2004 was 
the next missed opportunity. The first version provided to 
European diplomats was a massive step backwards that 
redefined and reduced the international standards to 
which Nepal was already committed.72 The final version, 
the outcome of ten days firm negotiation by EU 
ambassadors, restated those existing commitments but, 
as human rights experts warned at the time, the lack of a 
monitoring mechanism -- the one suggestion the 
government steadfastly refused -- rendered it meaningless in 
practical terms. Some governments subsequently used 
this restatement of commitments as an argument there 
should be no mention of Nepal at the 2004 Commission 
on Human Rights.  
The inability of the international community to push 
for reforms and improved protection based on the 
commitment paper is a clear example of the dangers of 
assuming goodwill where there is no evidence of genuine 
commitment to change. The government could have 
demonstrated such goodwill by taking steps that involved 
no need for financial or other aid, for example by giving 
 
 
71 "'Our party has been taking the calls and concerns for peace 
from the UN, European Union and other international human 
rights organisations and individuals seriously, we have been 
welcoming that', Prachanda, whose real name is Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal, said in a statement today. 'We have also made 
it clear that we would accept mediation and observation from 
the UN toward creating an environment whereby people's 
mandate could be solicited peacefully'", The Kathmandu 
Post, 5 February 2004. 
72 Crisis Group interview with European diplomats and UN 
staff, March 2004. 
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clear political backing to the Supreme Court over habeas 
corpus orders or prosecuting human rights violators. 
D. TOOTHLESS CHAIR STATEMENT AT THE 
2004 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
In April 2004 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
took what could have been an important step in the 
form of the chairman's statement urging the 
commitment of the government to a monitoring effort 
of sufficient scale to make an impact on impunity. 
There was a perfect opportunity to follow up this 
statement with practical measures at the major donors 
meeting in Kathmandu in May, the Nepal Development 
Forum. This did not happen, and it was only in 
December that the OHCHR finally signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the government, 
the details of which have not yet been made public. By 
the time of the royal coup, there had been no significant 
increase in the UN's capacity to monitor the human 
rights situation. It had even failed to appoint a human 
rights and peace process senior adviser to the NHRC 
due to wrangling over control of the selection process. 
V. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
The overarching goals must be: 
 restoration of full civil and political rights, 
including freedom of association, expression and 
assembly, and establishment of democratic 
governance; 
 full compliance with international humanitarian 
law by both armed parties; and, 
 rapid resumption of the peace process with 
international support, using human rights 
engagement (such as a Human Rights Accord) as 
a confidence-building measure. 
It is crucial that the international community present a 
coherent, common position on recent events but the 
primary responsibility for action rests with the armed 
parties to the conflict, the government and the Maoists. 
The following sections outline the most important steps 
they and the international community should take.73
A. ACTION BY THE NEPALI GOVERNMENT 
The key measures which should be taken immediately by 
the royal government require neither great resources nor 
external technical assistance. The royal government 
should: 
Reverse the suspension of rights since 1 February. 
The immediate steps include: (i) releasing politicians, 
human rights defenders, journalists and others currently 
held in preventive detention; (ii) lifting the state of 
emergency;74 (iii) ending the suspension of constitutional 
rights; and (iv) removing media censorship to allow 
reporting of human rights violations and honest war 
coverage. 
End the practice of enforced disappearances by security 
forces. Competent civilian authorities should investigate 
all disappearance cases and prosecute those responsible.75
 
 
73 This is a concise overview. Most of the individual points 
are addressed in more detail in the many reports by specialist 
human rights NGOs cited above. 
74 States have a right to declare emergencies but the current 
state of emergency in Nepal has been imposed illegally. The 
manner of its declaration and the derogation from 
fundamental obligations are in breach of Nepal's domestic 
law and international conventions. For a detailed explanation, 
see "Nepal: The Rule of Law Abandoned", International 
Commission of Jurists, 17 March 2005. 
75 See "Nepal: Escalating 'disappearances' amid a culture of 
impunity", Amnesty International, 30 August 2004, available at 
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Renounce the use of vigilante groups. Recourse to 
village militias and other extrajudicial means to 
tackle the Maoists is counterproductive and has 
already produced gross human rights violations. If 
the government continues to encourage this, the 
conflict will intensify and become more intractable. 
Cooperate with the international community to 
tackle the human rights crisis by (i) accepting a 
strong UN-led international human rights monitoring 
mission; (ii) accepting appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur and issuing a standing invitation to the 
thematic mechanisms of the Commission on Human 
Rights to visit Nepal;76 (iii) allowing the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to fulfil its 
mandate; and (iv) encouraging the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) to accept standing offers 
of technical assistance. 
End the culture of impunity. The royal government 
can take immediate steps to demonstrate commitment 
to ending the culture of impunity enjoyed by human 
rights abusers by (i) guaranteeing the independence 
of the judiciary and ensuring security forces' full 
cooperation with the courts; (ii) prosecuting those 
responsible for the Doramba killings as demanded by 
the OHCHR in September 2003; (iii) investigating 
and prosecuting in the civilian courts other cases of 
alleged rights abuses, including gender-based 
violence; (iv) issuing clear instructions to all security 
forces that any torture or other human rights 
violations will be punished; and (v) recognising that 
the National Human Rights Action Plan, a collection 
of "mainstreaming" and awareness-raising measures 
which has been strongly criticised by experts, is an 
insufficient and inappropriate response to the current 
situation and urgently developing effective measures 
to address the human rights protection crisis. 
Strengthen the legal framework for human rights 
and international humanitarian law by (i) ensuring 
full compliance with Nepal's existing commitments 
under domestic and international law;77 (ii) repealing 
or amending the Public Security Act and the 
 
 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA311552004 
and "Clear Culpability: 'Disappearances' by Security Forces 
in Nepal", Human Rights Watch, 1 March 2005, available at 
www.hrw.org. 
76 On thematic mechanisms see "Nepal: Human Rights 
Concerns for the 61st Session of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights", Human Rights Watch, 10 March 2005, 
available at www.hrw.org. 
77 For example, the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Terrorism and Destructive Activities Ordinance;78 (iii) 
signing the Human Rights Accord (HRA); (iv) signing 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions; 
and (v) signing the Rome Statute on the International 
Criminal Court. 
Strengthen the capacity of the NHRC. The royal 
government should ensure that the principal national 
body responsible for monitoring human rights is able 
to carry out its responsibilities by (i) extending the 
term of the current Commissioners; (ii) permitting the 
Commissioners and other NHRC officers to travel 
freely and fulfil their mandate effectively; (iii) 
respecting the physical integrity of the offices in 
Kathmandu, Biratnagar and Nepalgunj so that the 
NHRC can protect sensitive information on victims 
and their relatives; and (iv) ensuring that other 
agencies such as the Human Rights Promotion Centre 
and the security forces' human rights cells are not used 
to undermine the work of the NHRC.79
B. ACTION BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
NEPAL (MAOIST) 
Cease human rights violations and adhere in full to 
international humanitarian law. The Maoists must in 
particular (i) respect the rights of the civilian population 
and hors de combat security forces; (ii) release political 
detainees immediately; (iii) halt the intimidation, torture 
and killing of political workers, journalists and others; 
and (iv) give and enforce clear instructions to all cadres 
on human rights and international humanitarian law. 
Work towards confidence building and rapid 
resumption of the peace process. The Maoists should 
(i) sign the Human Rights Accord; (ii) cooperate with 
national and international human rights monitors; and 
 
78 See "Nepal: The Rule of Law Abandoned", International 
Commission of Jurists, 17 March 2005. 
79 Human rights cells were established within the armed and 
civilian police forces in January 2001 and within the RNA in 
July 2002. A similar cell was established in the Home Ministry 
in January 2003, and a Human Rights Promotion Centre under 
the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers' office was 
established in December 2003. The latter has served primarily 
as a smokescreen for lack of action and as a rival body to the 
NHRC. The police and RNA cells have neither prevented 
rights violations nor addressed the culture of impunity. See 
"Nepal: Escalating 'disappearances' amid a culture of 
impunity", Amnesty International, 30 August 2004, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA 311552004. On 
17 March 2005, the government announced the formation of a 
further nine-member High-level Committee for Protection of 
Human Rights headed by the Attorney-General (see Section VI 
A below). 
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(iii) develop transparent methods for dealing with rights 
abuses, including cases of gender-based violence. 
C. ACTION AT THE COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The member states of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR) should use its 61st session to address 
Nepal's human rights crisis, recognising that it is too 
grave for this to be done by technical assistance alone. 
Whichever CHR mechanism is employed, the 
Commission should establish an effective international 
monitoring presence in Nepal by: 
 deploying a clearly mandated mission of the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), adequately staffed by international 
monitors and national support staff sufficient to 
work across Nepal's difficult terrain; 
 ensuring that the head of the mission is of sufficient 
UN rank and ability to collate, evaluate and act on 
the information gathered by monitors; and 
 ensuring that the mission and its monitors are 
respected by both armed parties to the conflict 
and its work is absolutely neutral. 
Additionally, the Commission should: 
 appoint a Special Rapporteur; 
 establish viable mechanisms to guarantee human 
rights improvements; and 
 encourage the government to issue a standing 
invitation to the thematic mechanisms of the 
Commission, including the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, to visit. 
D. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTION  
The international community as a whole, including 
CHR member states, diplomatic missions to Nepal, 
bilateral and multilateral donors should take a range of 
further measures. As in all armed conflicts, the basic 
requirement the international community should insist 
on is ensuring that the ICRC has unhindered access, 
without prior warning, to all detainees and the ability to 
interview them confidentially. Other urgent steps include: 
Use available leverage to end the culture of impunity. 
The international community can use its leverage to 
bring effective pressure for improvements by: (i) 
preparing to suspend the RNA from UN peacekeeping 
operations if it does not improve its record; (ii) making 
human rights protection a condition of military and other 
assistance; and (iii) demonstrating that it is prepared, 
through the UN Security Council, to authorise the 
International Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction over 
exceptionally serious violations of international 
humanitarian law by either the state or the Maoists unless 
such violations cease and/or are submitted to fair and 
impartial domestic investigation and prosecution.80
Support the NHRC. Donors have already played a 
major role in building the NHRC's capacity and 
providing political support but this has not been enough, 
and stronger measures are needed, including: (i) 
demanding that its statute be respected in both letter and 
spirit so it can fulfil its mandate; (ii) insisting on the 
extension of the current Commissioners' term; and (iii) 
planning, funding and implementing (most probably 
through the UN) all appropriate assistance it requests. 
Help build non-governmental human rights capacity. 
The international community has a role to play in 
defending and strengthening national human rights 
NGOs, including women's organisations, and relevant 
professional associations, such as the Nepal Bar 
Association and the Federation of Nepali Journalists. It 
should also assist in developing practical programs for 
protecting human rights defenders. 
Support the judicial system. Short-term steps to help 
strengthen the judiciary include: (i) sending an 
international mission to assess current capacity and 
evaluate what it is able to do in light of the suspension of 
constitutional rights; and (ii) designing immediate 
measures, including training and infrastructure support, 
in consultation with the Supreme Court and the Nepal 
Bar Association. 
Address humanitarian concerns. In conjunction with 
human rights measures, the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation requires attention. Appropriate immediate 
actions include: (i) ensuring identification and protection 
for the increasing numbers of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs); (ii) recommending that the UN Resident 
Coordinator in Nepal also be appointed Humanitarian 
Coordinator; and (iii) ensuring that the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has 
 
80 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour 
raised the possibility of such investigations and prosecutions 
during her visit to Nepal in January 2005, shortly before the 
royal coup, Nepal is not a signatory to the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) but the 
Security Council could authorise that Court to exercise 
jurisdiction similar to what is currently under discussion with 
respect to the situation in the Darfur area of Sudan. The U.S., 
which objects to the ICC, has opposed such a referral on Darfur 
and supports the use of an ad hoc tribunal. 
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sufficient capacity to respond if the situation worsens 
dramatically. 
Plan longer-term action. Now is the time to start 
preparing for further action such as: (i) provision of 
technical assistance as part of a peace process, for 
example in election monitoring, cantonment of arms, and 
disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former 
combatants; (ii) strengthening democratic institutions; 
and (iii) assisting in security sector reform to ensure a 
stable transition to a responsible, well trained and 
democratically controlled military complemented by a 
clearly separate civilian police force. 
VI. HOW TO GET THERE 
A. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND 
MECHANISMS 
Nepal's allies and donors. Despite significant differences 
in perspectives and approaches, the major international 
players share a large common ground on Nepal. The 
desire to see the conflict resolved with the country stable 
and able to pursue economic, social and political 
development is almost universal. Despite initial fears in 
the Indian press about Nepal "playing the China card" 
Indian diplomats are not overly concerned: China, too, 
wishes to see the conflict contained and has consistently 
been reluctant to become directly involved. Its foreign 
policy priorities lie elsewhere, and it is unlikely to 
undermine a reasonable international consensus. European 
donors have major, longstanding concerns over the human 
rights situation. The European Union has reassured India 
and the U.S. that its basic position is in consonance with 
theirs. India has been the most prominent advocate of 
democratic rights in the post-coup period. Indications 
that New Delhi and Washington might look favourably 
on a CHR resolution have further strengthened the sense 
of shared purpose. While differences in understanding 
between various embassies in Kathmandu persist, 
international actors have much more in common than 
even they themselves may realise. The prospects for a 
coherent multilateral approach to the conflict are 
probably better than ever.81 The Commission on Human 
Rights will be one test of the viability of a united front. 
Beyond that, discussions on formalising a multilateral 
contact group hold out the possibilities of coordinated 
action towards a longer-term peace process.82
The United Nations. The UN has a particularly important 
role to play on human rights, through both the Secretary 
General's good offices and substantive technical 
assistance under a CHR mandate. The OHCHR has a 
unique capacity to manage an effective field monitoring 
mission. The UN is also widely respected in Nepal across 
political and civil war divides. There are valid concerns 
about its ability to mediate the conflict but it will not 
automatically be preordained to attempt this if it does on-
the-ground human rights monitoring, which could in 
turn form a valuable basis for future humanitarian, 
ceasefire, election monitoring or other peace building 
operations.  
 
 
81 In the period since 1 February, Crisis Group has interviewed 
dozens of senior diplomats in Kathmandu, New Delhi, 
Washington, New York, London, Geneva, Bern, Brussels, 
Berlin, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm and other capitals. 
82 See Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal: Responding to the Royal 
Coup, op. cit., for a concise description of contact group options. 
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The 61st Commission on Human Rights. The annual 
CHR is the logical forum for a concerted multilateral 
effort to tackle Nepal's human rights crisis. Lessons 
learned from the 2004 CHR's failure to halt deterioration 
in the situation may now be put to good use. The ideal 
outcome would be for the Nepali government to accept 
robust international assistance in addressing its 
challenges.83 In his address at the start of the CHR, 
Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey insisted, "we are 
committed to our human rights obligations even in the 
extremely difficult situation at present".84 Nevertheless, 
there are consistent indications from Kathmandu that 
the royal government will resist decisive action. For 
example, the Director of the Human Rights Promotion 
Centre in the Prime Minister's Office, Diwakar Pant, 
has insisted there is no need for a Special Rapporteur.85 
Officials apparently still hope a combination of token 
gestures and international indecisiveness may allow 
them to avoid anything serious. Coordinated international 
planning for a strong resolution may be the only way 
forward. The key issues that should inform the debate 
are: 
 Outcome not promises. The strongest paper 
commitments cannot guarantee implementation. 
Member states will have to consider how to hold a 
reluctant government to its commitments and help 
it to fulfil them. A monitoring mission would be a 
good start.  
 Types of resolution. Discussion over whether a 
technical assistance resolution under Agenda Item 
19 is more appropriate than a stronger condemnatory 
resolution under Agenda Item 9 should not take 
precedence over consideration of the outcome. The 
current momentum towards an Item 9 resolution is 
logical and appropriate as long as it delivers a 
viable monitoring mechanism.86 
 Special Rapporteur. The appointment of a 
Special Rapporteur has many advantages but in 
itself would do nothing to address the immediate 
crisis. In the absence of a strong monitoring 
mission, it would almost certainly be ineffective. If 
a Special Rapporteur is to be effective, it can only 
be as an addition to a field monitoring presence. 
Other leverage. The Nepali government is heavily 
dependent on external political, military, financial and 
 
 
83 As outlined in Section V A above. 
84 "Pandey defends royal move at Geneva meet", 
www.nepalnews.com, 16 March 2005. 
85 "There is no need for UN special rapporteur: Official", 
www.nepalnews.com, 14 March 2005. 
86 Agenda Item 19 is normally used for technical assistance 
subjects while Item 9 is normally reserved for condemnatory 
resolutions. 
development support and is therefore relatively easy to 
lean on.87 The Maoists, however, have tended to be more 
or less immune to outside pressure. Their insurgency is 
largely funded and sustained domestically so supply lines 
cannot readily be cut; whatever links there are with 
Indian rebels do not appear to be essential. Military 
pressure has proved if anything counterproductive. But 
the Maoists do not want to be permanent pariahs and 
wish to keep the door open to becoming a party of 
government. That creates a possibility to influence their 
human rights behaviour by making it a test of their good 
faith and reliability.88
The danger of token gestures. The Nepali government 
is likely to make a number of token gestures during the 
CHR, timed to create an impression at crucial points in 
the discussions. Such gestures might include: 
 release of certain political leaders, perhaps leaders 
of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML parties;89 
 relaxation of censorship, particularly in the English-
language media, which has greater external visibility 
than domestic influence; 
 senior pledges on human rights and multiparty 
democracy;90 
 limited disciplinary action against a few low-
ranking rights abusers;91  
 assurances that the emergency measures are 
dramatically improving the security situation;92 
and 
 
87 See Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal: Responding to the Royal 
Coup, op. cit., for discussion of options including smart 
sanctions and targeted aid freezes. 
88 See above, Section IV B. 
89 For example, the vice chairman of the royal government, 
Peter Giri, stated in the government's first press conference 
that it was continuously releasing detained political leaders. 
In response to a question on press censorship, Giri said all the 
present measures had been taken for security reasons and 
would be gradually relaxed as the situation eased. "Vice 
Chairman Giri extends olive branch to parties", op. cit. 
90 Peter Giri has asserted that the king's stated commitment to 
multiparty democracy was a sufficient guarantee in itself: "As 
the king has said that he wants to reenergise democracy, the 
system is not in danger", ibid. 
91 For example, it was announced on 15 March 2005 that an 
RNA Court of Inquiry had concluded that "some mistakes" 
led to the "incident" resulting in the death of fifteen-year-old 
Maina Sunar on 17 February 2004. Given that the "incident" 
involved the abduction, torture, rape and killing of an 
innocent schoolgirl, the term "mistake" seems an inappropriate 
understatement. "RNA admits mistake in Kharelthok incident", 
15 March 2005, www.kantipuronline.com.  
92 For example, Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey is 
reported to have briefed some of his counterparts gathered in 
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 offering to accept watered-down benchmarks that 
restate existing commitments without providing 
mechanisms for implementation. 
There is danger such gestures may be mistaken for 
genuine change and used to justify allowing the royal 
government to avoid action. This danger can be readily 
judged by the experience of the 26 March 2004 
commitment paper described above. Already the royal 
government and RNA show increasing sophistication in 
their suppression of dissent. Only a few prominent 
human rights defenders are being detained but others 
are being subjected to a range of less visible, no less 
effective harassment and intimidation techniques such 
as surveillance of homes and offices, threatening phone 
calls and travel restrictions.93  
A new nine-member High-level Committee for Protection 
of Human Rights under the chairmanship of the Attorney-
General has been announced. Minister for Information 
and Communication Tanka Dhakal explained: "With a 
view to strengthening the National Human Rights 
Commission and making it effective, the committee will 
assist to the commission in monitoring and investigation 
of human rights".94 The way to make the NHRC effective, 
however, would be to allow it to fulfil its mandate. The 
new committee's role is obscure and almost certainly 
obstructionist: while it will "take necessary measures 
concerning cases of violations of human rights in line 
with the commitments made in March last year", it "will 
decide its own scope of work and rules of procedures".95
Why only target the government? The other 
predictable fallback for the royal government will be to 
ask why disproportionate demands are made on the 
state. Officials will point out that draft resolutions and 
non-governmental reports such as this ask more of the 
government than of the Maoists, even though the 
insurgents initiated the conflict. The simple response is 
that the demands are commensurate with the status and 
responsibilities of the two sides. The Maoists are obliged 
to adhere to the minimum standards of international law 
-- a demand reiterated here as in all statements by 
governments and NGOs. But governments have greater 
responsibilities. The Maoists would be most happy to 
have symmetrical demands made of them that would 
imply a moral and practical equivalency between 
 
 
Geneva about the current law and security situation, 
insisting that it "was improving rapidly and in a significant 
manner". "FM Pandey meets ministers of different countries 
in Geneva", 17 March 2005, www.nepalnews.com. 
93 Crisis Group interviews with human rights defenders, 
Kathmandu and New Delhi, February-March 2005. 
94 "Govt. forms human rights committee", 17 March 2005, 
www.kantipuronline.com. 
95 Ibid. 
themselves and the state. They would see this as a 
vindication of their claim to be a "new regime" equal to 
the "old regime". It is by fulfilling its judicial, 
constitutional and administrative duties that the state can 
demonstrate moral superiority. 
B. EFFECTIVE ACTION 
Piecemeal measures to improve the human rights 
situation, such as those attempted through 2004, are 
inadequate given the depth of the crisis. Remedial action 
must be on a scale which reflects the size of the problem 
if the vast majority of Nepalis, particularly those outside 
the Kathmandu Valley, are not to be left at the mercy of 
the Maoists and the RNA. 
Government security forces are unable to be present much 
beyond the confines of the district headquarters. This leaves 
the civilian population, most of whom owe little allegiance 
to either the King or the Maoists, prey to rebel extortion and 
"justice". At the same time, the RNA is likely to continue 
its practice of killing more civilians than combatants as it 
comes under pressure to show that, post-1 February, it is 
making significant gains. In short, it is the civilians who 
will suffer until a peace process is back on track. 
1. Beyond technical assistance 
Technical assistance is useful when there is relative 
political stability and political will to improve human 
rights protection. It is, however, a wholly inappropriate 
response to Nepal's acute human rights protection crisis in 
a context of civil war and political uncertainty. In any 
case, technical assistance should be based on the needs 
identified through monitoring. The magnitude of the 
problem makes tinkering and small initiatives futile. 
Indeed, many otherwise worthy efforts could unwittingly 
feed the crisis. Those responsible for violations are quick 
to point to the existence of any human rights project to 
deflect attention from their record. They use any technical 
assistance as a smoke screen, claiming efforts are 
underway, and time is needed for the results to appear. 
The government's National Human Rights Action Plan is 
unwieldy and at best long-term: it fails to address the 
immediate protection crisis and is used by the 
government to distract attention from pressing problems. 
In early 2004, for example, a Nepali minister meeting a 
European ambassador to discuss lack of progress on the 
Doramba case, started by handing over a draft of the 
Plan, the existence of which, he said, should lead the 
international community to go easy on specific cases.96 
 
96 Crisis Group interview with European diplomat, March 
2004. 
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The experience with the March 2004 commitment 
paper at the 2004 Commission on Human Rights has 
already been discussed. Unless the scale of the remedy 
matches the scale of the problem, and unless the remedy 
creates critical mass in response to the crisis, ineffectual 
interventions will be used as an alibi to continue 
widespread violations. 
2. Towards a successful monitoring operation 
The management, political and technical, of any human 
rights monitoring operation will be key for its success 
or failure. The gathering of credible information, a 
tough task with security implications, is merely the 
beginning. The objective is to process and then use the 
information to encourage an end of violations. Therein 
lies the start to confidence building, a prerequisite if an 
atmosphere conducive to a genuine peace process is to 
be created. It is also an important tool with which to 
prevent sabotage of a renewed process by those on both 
sides who oppose a move to peace. 
Significant improvement in the human rights situation 
demands a genuine peace process but this can happen 
only after a significant improvement in the current 
levels of confidence. Only one major confidence-
building measure is on the table: the NHRC's Human 
Rights Accord. An acceptable equivalent arrangement, 
if it is not possible to orchestrate signature of this 
document, might be a combination of the government's 
March 2004 commitment paper and permission for the 
OHCHR to deploy a critical mass of human rights 
observers -- at least fifteen or twenty. However, it 
would be necessary to get public Maoist support for this 
monitoring, both to make the effort effective politically 
and for use as a lever to improve the security situation 
of those implementing it on the ground. 
The task of monitors in remote areas would be to reveal 
violations that the belligerents wish to keep hidden. For 
success and credibility, the monitors must have 
unannounced access to places of detention of both sides. 
This requires prior commitment by the parties. There is 
an obvious danger in deploying monitors without Maoist 
agreement: if they are refused access by the Maoists, 
they will be forced to remain in the district headquarters 
and be vulnerable to accusations that they are only 
monitoring the state security forces. Further, both parties 
must be conscious that failure to comply with their 
commitments to a monitoring process would have a 
political cost at the international level. Above all though, 
the activities of a monitoring mission have to be seen to 
be both professionally competent and politically neutral. 
The UN's many human rights missions over the past 
decade show that monitoring has to be carefully adapted 
to a specific environment if it is to lead to an improved 
situation; the cataloguing of violations is the essential 
first step; processed information must then be presented 
to the parties to the conflict in such a way that it has a 
positive impact on their conduct. It is necessary to ensure 
buy-in from the parties, which in turn raises the political 
cost of ignoring findings and recommendations of the 
agreed monitoring body. The sending authority of the 
mission itself controls several key factors, such as 
personnel, particularly the leadership; the clarity and 
feasibility of the mandate; the financial resources; 
security of the monitors; adequate training to ensure 
uniformity of procedures and reporting; and the capacity 
at headquarters to collate and analyse the information. 
The mission must be able to provide comprehensive 
nationwide reporting in order to defend itself from the 
inevitable accusations of partiality as both sides attempt 
to mitigate the political cost of findings against them.  
A human rights monitoring mission must hit the ground 
running. Any serious impact is likely to occur in the first 
year, when the stakeholders tend to attribute greatest 
importance to its findings. A slow build-up of monitoring 
capacity can be a fatal weakness. Much depends, 
therefore, on the quality of initial deployment. It is also 
essential that stakeholders be ready to intervene in the 
political space which the newly deployed mission will 
create. Monitors in the field without political guidance, 
the support of desk officers at headquarters, and a public 
information campaign about their mission can achieve 
almost nothing. 
3. Preconditions for a successful monitoring 
mission 
There are serious security issues which affect both the 
mission members, national and international, and all 
those with whom they have contact, particularly victims 
and witnesses. While standard security procedures need 
to be followed, the overwhelming influence on the 
security of all concerned is political. The parties to the 
conflict must at a minimum be locked publicly into the 
project in such a manner that they would incur a political 
cost locally if they breached their commitment to it. It 
would be irresponsible to send monitors into a conflict 
situation without at least a basic commitment by both 
sides to respect their integrity and allow them to work as 
their mandate specified 
The credibility of a mission can be fatally damaged by 
flawed information work or failure to achieve an 
impact. Informants are aware of the risks in 
cooperating. If there are no results as a result of that 
cooperation, it will quickly dry up.  
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VII. CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND PEACEBUILDING 
Effective action on human rights, starting with a CHR 
resolution, can form the base for a peacebuilding 
process: 
 the human rights dimension is the most significant 
available confidence-building avenue; 
 human rights pressure offers some potential 
leverage on the Maoists; 
 multilateral action on human rights complements 
other political efforts underway and a possible 
contact group; 
 the human rights dimension is a subject on which 
major states and the UN can work in concert while 
retaining distinct roles; and 
 human rights efforts can complement and 
reinforce a parallel "development track" of 
confidence building through the existing Basic 
Operating Guidelines group of major donors.97 
The crisis of protection clearly parallels the deepening 
military conflict and will only begin to be mitigated 
meaningfully by initiation of a genuine peace process. 
The international human rights response, therefore, 
should focus on creating a context that will help produce 
such a peace process. It is widely agreed the failure of 
the last peace talks (marked by the breakdown of the 
January 2003 ceasefire on 27 August 2003) was at least 
in part due to underlying lack of confidence between the 
parties to the conflict. Human rights activities should be 
conceived of, and designed as confidence-building 
measures. A crucial first step would be a joint political 
statement by the belligerents on human rights measures, 
along with a means to assess compliance. This can only 
be achieved by creating a mechanism that provides 
credible and prompt information on violations, both to 
dispel rumours and mistrust and to create the possibility 
of restoring the rule of law. The public needs to be 
convinced it is possible to move beyond the arbitrary 
exercise of power by both sides. 
At this stage of the conflict, it is important to take 
initiatives which change the political atmosphere and 
break with the past practices of both parties. This 
requires boldness on a scale sufficient to have visible 
impact. One such move is the monitoring proposed in 
 
 
 
97 The Basic Operating Guidelines were developed by a 
consortium of major European donors in collaboration with 
the UN. 
the NHRC's HRA. As High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Louise Arbour urged: 
Chief among [the necessary measures] is the need 
for both parties to the conflict to sign and 
implement the Human Rights Accord drawn up by 
the National Human Rights Commission. This 
Accord is nothing more than a reiteration of 
obligations which already bind both the 
Government and the CPN/Maoist. A failure to sign 
the Accord by either party calls into question the 
sincerity of their professed commitment to the 
welfare of the people of Nepal. Equally, I have no 
doubt that the signing of the Accord by both parties, 
coupled with genuine efforts to implement its 
provisions, will serve to build confidence, which 
is, in turn, a vital prerequisite for a genuine and 
lasting peace.98
The last round of peace talks, from January to August 
2003, was supposedly regulated by a comprehensive 22-
point Code of Conduct, which covered most fundamental 
rights and was considered an indication of mutual good 
will when it was signed on 13 March 2003.99 While the 
ceasefire was broadly respected until the Doramba 
massacre of 17 August, the Code of Conduct was 
constantly violated, in part, at least, due to its lack of 
precision. Most crucially, though, it had no monitoring 
mechanism, so breaches carried little political cost. This 
contributed to the fact that the ceasefire failed to build 
confidence. 
The more the international community appears to accept 
statements in lieu of concrete measures, the more the 
Maoists will conclude that mouthing human rights pieties 
will be enough to open the door to their return to the 
political mainstream. A softly-softly approach with the 
government forces in the face of massive violations 
merely sends a signal to the Maoists that they can get 
away with the same.  
There are indications that the Maoists recognise that their 
best chance of achieving some of their objectives is to 
negotiate their way back into the mainstream of Nepali 
politics. They are, however, aware that their return to 
democratic politics will require the sanction of the 
 
98 Press statement, op. cit. 
99 The 22-point code of conduct signed by the government and 
Maoists stipulated, among other things, that the RNA would 
remain in current positions and would not carry out armed 
searches or arrests of Maoist activists, "Both sides have agreed 
to refrain from displaying weapons or strength which may 
terrorize the public and will resist from resorting to violence 
and other means that may vitiate or derail the peace process", 
Information and Communication Minister Ramesh Nath 
Pandey, Agence France-Presse, 13 March 2004. 
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international community. It is unfortunate that over the 
past year their offers to accept both international human 
rights monitoring and UN facilitation in the peace 
process have been ignored and therefore gone untested. 
At this stage of an increasingly dirty war, it would be 
unwise to take the statements of either belligerent at 
face value but neither can the international community 
afford to pass over opportunities, however limited. 
Equally damaging would be to accept the king's current 
argument that one is either with him or against him. 
There are other options. If developed coherently, human 
rights interventions could be an important step towards 
a peace process.  
An effective human rights monitoring effort would need 
to be preceded by political agreement from the 
government and the Maoists at least along the lines of 
the HRA. Political commitment to the improvement of 
human rights is a pre-requisite for successful progress 
towards the rule of law. Improved compliance with 
international humanitarian and human rights law by the 
belligerents is a necessary step towards peace and 
meaningful restoration of democracy. Equally, there is 
little chance of significant improvement in the human 
rights crisis until there is a renewed peace process. The 
HRA should be implemented in such a way that it 
becomes a confidence-building measure and 
encourages the belligerents to return to the peace table. 
The end of the conflict and improvement in respect for 
human rights are inextricably linked. 
Without concrete action on human rights and the full 
enjoyment of democratic rights, a "swift return to 
democracy" as called for by the major powers with 
influence in Nepal would be little more than a return to 
the unsatisfactory status quo ante. Nepal's people would 
be condemned to further erosion of their rights and 
gross violations by both armed parties, and resolution of 
the conflict would be at least as far away as ever. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 24 March 2005 
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